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Abstract. Designing fault tolerance mechanisms for multi-agent sys-
tems is a notoriously difficult task. In this paper we present an approach
to formal development of a fault tolerant multi-agent system by refine-
ment in Event-B. We demonstrate how to formally specify cooperative
error recovery and dynamic reconfiguration in Event-B. Moreover, we
discuss how to express and verify essential properties of a fault tolerant
multi-agent system while refining it. The approach is illustrated by a
case study – a multi-robotic system.
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1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MAS) and in particular the agent cooperation have been
a subject of an active research over the last decade. In this paper we focus on
studying the fault tolerance aspects of agent cooperation. Namely, we discuss
how to express and verify essential properties of a fault tolerant MAS. More-
over, we show by example how to formally derive a specification of a MAS that
relies on dynamic reconfiguration and cooperative error recovery to achieve fault
tolerance.
In this paper, we present a formal development of a cleaning multi-robotic
system. The system has a heterogenous architecture consisting of several sta-
tionary devices, base stations, that coordinate the work of respective groups of
robots. Since both base stations and robots can fail, the main objective of our
formal development is to formally specify cooperative error recovery and verify
that the proposed design ensures goal reachability. The proposed development
approach ensures goal reachability “by construction”. It is based on refinement
in Event-B [1] – a formal top-down approach to correct-by-construction system
development. In this paper we demonstrate how to formally define a system
goal and, in a stepwise manner, derive a detailed specification of the system
architecture.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly overview the Event-
B formalism. In Section 3 we define the main principles of formal reasoning
about goal-oriented MAS, describe the requirements for our case study – a multi-
robotic system – and outline the development strategy. Section 4 presents a
formal development of the system and demonstrates how to express and verify
its properties during the refinement process. Finally, in Section 5 we overview
the related work and discuss the achieved results.
2 Modelling and Refinement in Event-B
Event-B is a state-based formal approach that promotes the
correct-by-construction development paradigm and formal verification by the-
orem proving [1]. In Event-B, a system model is specified using the notion of
an abstract state machine. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model
state represented as a collection of variables, and defines operations on this
state, i.e., it describes the behaviour of the modelled system. A machine may
have the accompanying component, called context. A context may include user-
defined carrier sets, constants and their properties (model axioms). In Event-B,
the model variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates called in-
variants. Moreover, the invariants specify important properties that should be
preserved during the system execution.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the set of atomic events.
Generally, an event can be defined as
evt =̂ any vl where g then S end
where vl is a list of new local variables, g is the guard, and S is the action. The
guard is a state predicate that defines the conditions under which the action
can be executed. In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of
deterministic or non-deterministic assignments.
The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce implementa-
tion details, while preserving functional correctness. The consistency of Event-B
models, i.e., invariant preservation, correctness of refinement steps, should be
formally demonstrated by discharging relevant proof obligations. The verifica-
tion efforts, in particular, automatic generation and proving of the required
proof obligations, are significantly facilitated by the Rodin platform [10]. Proof-
based verification as well as reliance on abstraction and decomposition adopted
in Event-B offers the designers a scalable support for the development of such
complex distributed systems as MAS.
3 Multi-Agent Systems
Our paper focuses on formal modelling and development of MAS that should
function autonomously, i.e., without human intervention. Typically, the main
task or goal that such a MAS should accomplish is split between the deployed
agents. Since agents may fail, to ensure success of the overall goal, we should in-
corporate some fault tolerance mechanisms into the system design. These mech-
anisms rely on cooperative error recovery that allows the system dynamically
reallocate functions from the failed agents to the healthy ones. A large number
of failure modes and scenarios makes verification of goal reachability in the pres-
ence of cooperative error recovery quite difficult and time-consuming. Therefore,
there is a clear need for rigorous approaches that support scalable design and
verification in a systematic manner.
3.1 Towards a Formalisation of a Goal-Oriented MAS
Let us now describe more formally the properties that a MAS is expected to
satisfy.
1. Let us to denote the system state space as Σ. Then the main goal G that
the system aims at accomplishing can be associated with a specific predicate
over Σ:
G : Σ → BOOL.
In other words, the system goal is reached in a particular state σ if and only
if G(σ) = TRUE.
2. The system goal G can usually be decomposed into a set of subgoals SGi,
where i ∈ 1..n. We suppose that there exists a precise relationships, Expr,
between reachability of the main goal and that of the subgoals such that:
G(σ) = TRUE ⇔ Expr(SG1(σ), ..., SGn(σ)) = TRUE.
3. We assume that the system is stable with respect to its goals (subgoals), i.e.,
once a particular goal (subgoal) is reached, it stays reached. In B models,
this property can be formulated as an invariant (using auxiliary variables to
refer to the relevant part of the previous system state σprev) of the form:
G(σprev) = TRUE ⇒ G(σ) = TRUE.
4. In multi-agent systems, (sub)goals are usually achieved by system agents.
Often a specific (sub)goal should be accomplished only by a particular subset
of agents. We call such agents eligible. Formally, for each subgoal SGi, we
define a eligibility function, SGi Elig:
SGi Elig : AGENTS×Σ → BOOL,
where AGENTS denotes a set of all the system agents. In practice, such a
function often checks whether a particular agent belongs to a specific class
of agents responsible for achieving the subgoal. Moreover, it also determines
whether the agent is able to perform the required task, i.e., it has not failed.
5. Since MAS are distributed, we assume that the knowledge about the (sub)goal
reachability is shared among the agents. In other words, each agent has its
own local copy of it. We model this by a family of functions Agent SGi,
where i ∈ 1..n:
Agent SGi : AGENTS ×Σ → BOOL.
The local and global knowledge must be consistent, i.e.,
SGi(σ) = FALSE ⇒ ∀a ∈ AGENTS.Agent SGi(a, σ) = FALSE. (1)
In practice, it means that the information about reaching a particular sub-
goal by an agent should be broadcasted to the other agents.
6. The essential property of the considered MAS is eventual reachability of its
main goal. In B models, such reachability is typically abstractly modelled by
a single event reaching the desired system state. The event is then refined by
the group of events terminating in the desired state. To prove termination,
the natural number expression, variant, should be defined and shown to
be decreased by the refined events. We assume that there exists a variant
expression Vi, Vi ∈ Σ → NAT, for each subgoal SGi of the system.
Since system agents may fail before reaching the assigned (sub)goal, to prove
eventual goal reachability, we need to introduce various agent cooperative
recovery scenarios that allow the active agents to take over the failed ones.
We will consider several such scenarios later in this paper.
To exemplify a goal-oriented development of MAS, next we present our case
study – a multi-robotic system. We start by informally defining the system re-
quirements. Then we demonstrate how to formally develop such a system in
Event-B and prove its essential properties.
3.2 A Case Study: A Multi-Robotic System
The goal of the multi-robotic system is to get a certain territory cleaned by
the robots. The territory is divided into several zones, which in turn are further
divided into a number of sectors. Each zone has a base station that coordinates
the cleaning activities within the zone. In general, one base station might coor-
dinate several zones. In its turn, each base station supervises a number of robots
attached to it by assigning cleaning tasks to them.
A robot is an autonomous electro-mechanical device that can move and clean.
A base station may assign a robot a specific sector to clean. Upon receiving the
task, the robot autonomously moves to this sector and performs cleaning. After
successfully completing its mission, the robot returns back to the base station to
receive a new task. The base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned
sectors. Moreover, the base stations periodically exchange the information about
their cleaned sectors.
While performing the given assignment, a robot may fail. Subsequently it
leads to a failure to clean the assigned sector. We assume that a base station is
able to detect all the failed robots attached to it. In case of a robot failure, the
base station may assign another active robot to perform the failed task.
A base station might fail as well. We assume that a failure of a base station
can be detected by the others stations. In that case, the healthy base stations
redistribute control over the zones and robots coordinated by the failed station.
Let us now formulate the main requirements and properties associated with
the multi-robotic system that is informally described above.
(PR1) The main system goal: the whole territory has to be cleaned.
(PR2) To clean the territory, every its zone has to be cleaned.
(PR3) To clean a zone, every its sector has to be cleaned.
(PR4) Every cleaned sector (zone) remains cleaned during the system execution.
(PR5) No two robots should clean the same sector. In other words, a robot gets
only non-assigned and non-cleaned sectors to clean.
(PR6) The information about the cleaned sectors stored in any base station has
to be consistent with the current state of the territory. More specifically, if a
base station considers a particular sector in some zone to be cleaned, then
this sector is marked as cleaned in the memory of the base station responsible
for it. Also, if a sector is marked as non-cleaned in the memory of the base
station responsible for it, then any base station sees it as non-cleaned.
(PR7) Base station cooperation: if a base station has been detected as failed then
some base station will take the responsibility for all the zones and robots of
the failed base station.
(PR8) Base station cooperation: if a base station has no more active robots, a
group of robot is sent to this base station from another base station.
(PR9) Base station cooperation: if a base station has cleaned all its zones, its
active robots may be reallocated under control of another base station.
The last three requirements essentially describe the cooperative recovery
mechanisms that we assume to be present in the described multi-robot system.
3.3 Formal Development Strategy
In the next section we will present a formal Event-B development of the described
multi-system robotic system. We demonstrate how to specify and verify the given
properties (PR1)–(PR9). Let us now give a short overview of this development
and highlight formal techniques used to ensure the proposed properties.
We start with a very abstract model, essentially representing the system be-
haviour as a process iteratively trying to achieve the main goal (PR1). The next
couple of data refinement steps decompose the main goal into a set of subgoals,
i.e., reformulate it in terms of zones and sectors. We will define the gluing in-
variants establishing a formal relationship between goals and the corresponding
subgoals. Thus, we will define a relation Expr, described in Section 3.1.
While the specification remains highly abstract, we postpone the proof of goal
reachability property by defining the corresponding events as anticipated. Once,
as a result of the refinement process, the model becomes sufficiently detailed,
we change the event statuses into convergent and prove their termination. To
achieve this, we need to define a variant – a natural number expression – and
show that the execution of any of these events decreases it.
Next we introduce the agent types – base stations and robots. The base sta-
tions coordinate execution of the tasks required to achieve the corresponding
subgoal, while the robots execute the tasks allocated to them. We formally de-
fine the relationships between different types of agents, as well as agents and
respective subgoals. These relationships are specified and proved as invariant
properties of the model.
The consequent refinement steps explicitly introduce agent failures, the in-
formation exchange as well as cooperation activities between the agents. The
integrity between the local and the global information stored within base sta-
tions is again formulated and proved as model invariant properties.
We assume that communication between the base stations as well as the
robots and the base stations is reliable. In other words, messages are always
transmitted correctly without any loss or errors. The main focus of our develop-
ment is on specifying and verifying the cooperative recovery mechanisms.
4 Development of a Multi-Robotic System in Event-B
4.1 Modelling system goals and subgoals
Abstract model. Our initial model abstractly represents the behaviour of the
described multi-robotic system. We aim at ensuring the property (PR1). We
define a variable goal ∈ STATE that models the current state of the system
goal, where STATE= {incompl, compl}. In the process of achieving the goal,
modeled by the event Body, the variable goal may eventually change its value
from incompl to compl. The value compl corresponds to the situation when the
goal is achieved, i.e., the whole territory is cleaned. The system continues its
execution until the whole territory is not cleaned, i.e., while goal stays incompl.
Body =̂ status anticipated
when goal 6= compl then goal :∈ STATE end
First refinement. In our first refinement step we elaborate on the process of
cleaning the territory. Specifically, we assume that the whole territory is divided
into n zones, where n ∈ N and n ≥ 1, and aim at ensuring the property (PR2). We
augment our model with a representation of subgoals. We associate the notion
of a subgoal with the process of cleaning a particular zone. A subgoal is achieved
only when the corresponding zone is cleaned. A new variable zones represents
the current subgoal status for every zone: zones ∈ 1..n→ STATE.
To establish the relationship between goal and subgoals and formalise the
property (PR2) per se, we formulate the gluing invariant:
goal = compl⇔ zones[1..n] = {compl}.
The invariant can be understood as follows: the territory is considered to be
cleaned if and only if its every zone is cleaned. In this case, the Expr, defined
in the Section 3, becomes a conjunction of the subgoals. To model cleaning of
a zone(s), we refined the abstract event Body. We model it in such a way that,
while a certain subgoal is reached, it stays reached. Hence we ensure the property
(PR4).
Second refinement. Next we further decompose system subgoals into a set
of subsubgoals. We assume that each zone in our system is divided into k sec-
tors, where k ∈ N and k ≥ 1, and aim at formalising the property (PR3). We
establish the relationship between the notion of a subsubgoal (or simply a task)
and the process of cleaning a particular sector. A task is completed when the
corresponding sector is cleaned. A new variable territory represents the current
status of each sector:
territory ∈ 1 .. n→ (1 .. k→ STATE).
The following gluing invariant expresses the relationship between subgoals and
subsubgoals (tasks) and correspondingly ensures the property (PR3):
∀j ·j ∈ 1 .. n⇒ (zones(j) = compl⇔ territory(j)[1 .. k] = {compl}).
The invariant says that a zone is cleaned if and only if each of its sectors is
cleaned.
The refined event Body is now models cleaning of a previously non-cleaned
sector:
Body =̂ refines Body status anticipated
any z, s, result
when z ∈ 1..n∧s ∈ 1 ..k∧ territory(z)(s) 6= compl ∧result ∈ STATE
then territory(z) := territory(z)✁− {s 7→ result} end
Let us observe that the event Body also preserves the property (PR4).
4.2 Introducing Agents
In the third refinement step we augment our model with a representation of
agents. In the model context, we define the abstract finite set AGENTS and its
disjointed non-empty subsets RB and BS that represent the robots and the base
stations respectively. To define a relationship between a zone and its supervising
base station, we introduce the variable responsible:
responsible ∈ 1 .. n→BS.
Each active robot is supervised by a certain base station. We model this
relationship between robots and their supervised station by a variable attached,
defined as a partial function:
attached ∈ RB 7→BS.
To coordinate the cleaning process, a base station stores the information
about its own cleaned sectors and updates the information about the status of
the other cleaned sectors. We assume that each base station has a “map” – the
knowledge about all sectors of the whole territory. To model this, we introduce
a new variable local map:
local map ∈ BS→ (1 .. n 7→ (1 .. k→ STATE)).
The abstract variable territory represents the global knowledge on the whole
territory. For any sector and zone, this global knowledge has to be consistent
with the information stored by the base stations. In particular, if in the local
knowledge of any base station a sector is marked as cleaned, then it should be
cleaned according to the global knowledge as well. To establish those relation-
ships, we formulate and prove the following invariant:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇒ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
For each base station, the local information about its zones and sectors always
coincides with the global knowledge about the corresponding zones and sectors:
∀bs, z, s·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒
(territory(z)(s) = incompl⇔ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl).
All together, these three invariants formalise the property (PR6). It easy to see
that these invariants are special cases of the property (1), formulated in the
Section 3.
A base station assigns a cleaning task to its attached robots. Here, we have
to ensure the property (PR5) – no two robots can clean the certain sector at the
same time. We introduce a number of new variables and an event NewTask to
model this behaviour.
The robot failures have some impact on execution of the cleaning process. The
task cannot be performed if the robot assigned for it has failed. To reflect this
behaviour, we refine the event Body by two events TaskSuccess and TaskFailure,
which respectively model successful and unsuccessful execution of the task.
TaskSuccess =̂ refines Body status convergent
any bs, rb, z, s
when bs ∈ BS ∧ rb ∈ dom(attached) ∧ attached(rb) = bs ∧ z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ responsible(z) = bs∧
asgn z(rb) = z ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ asgn s(rb) = s ∧ local map(bs)(z)(s) = incompl
then territory(z) := territory(z)✁− {s 7→ compl} ‖
asgn s(rb) := 0 ‖ asgn z(rb) := 0 ‖ counter := counter − 1 ‖
local map(bs) := local map(bs)✁− {z 7→ local map(bs)(z) ✁− {s 7→ compl}} end
At this refinement step, we are ready to demonstrate that the events
TaskSuccess and TaskFailure converge. To prove it, we define the variant ex-
pression over system variables, counter + card(dom(attached)), and prove that
it is decreased by new events. An auxiliary variable counter stores the number
of all non-cleaned sectors of the whole territory, see [8] for details.
A base station keeps track of the cleaned and non-cleaned sectors and repeat-
edly receives the information from the other base stations about their cleaned
sectors. The knowledge is inaccurate for the period when the information is sent
but not yet received. In this refinement step, we abstractly model receiving the
information by a base station. We introduce a new event UpdateMap to model
updating of the local map of a base station.
In this refinement step we also introduce an abstract representation of the
base station cooperation defined by the property (PR7). Namely, we allow to
reassign a group of robots from one base station to another. We define such a
behaviour in the event ReassignRB. In the next refinement steps we will elaborate
on this event and define the conditions under which this behaviour takes place.
Additionally, we model a possible redistribution between the base stations
their pre-assigned responsibility for zones and robots. This behaviour is defined
in the new event GetAdditionalResponsibility presented below. The guard of the
event defines the conditions when such a change is allowed. A base station can
take the responsibility for a set of new zones if it has the accurate knowledge
about these zones, i.e., the information about their cleaned and non-cleaned
sectors.
GetAdditionalResponsibility =̂
any bs i, bs j, rbs, zs
when bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ zs ⊂ 1 .. n ∧ zs = dom(responsible ✄ {bs i}) ∧ bs i 6= bs j ∧
rbs ⊂ dom(attached) ∧ rbs = dom(attached✄ {bs i}) ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
(∀z, s·z ∈ zs ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs j)(z)(s))
then responsible := responsible ✁− (zs × {bs j}) ‖ attached := attached✁− (rbs× {bs j}) ‖
local map(bs i) := ∅ ‖ asgn z := asgn z✁− (rbs×{0}) ‖ asgn s := asgn s✁− (rbs×{0})
end
Modelling this behaviour allows us to formalise the property (PR9).
4.3 Modelling of Broadcasting
In next, fourth refinement step we aim at defining an abstract model of broad-
casting. After receiving a notification from a robot about successful cleaning the
assigned sector, a base station updates its local map and broadcasts the message
about the cleaned sector to the other base stations. In its turn, upon receiving
the message, each base station correspondingly updates its own local map. A
new relational variable msg models the message broadcasting buffer:
msg ∈ BS↔ (1 .. n× 1 .. k).
If a message (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) belongs to this buffer then the sector s from the zone
z has been cleaned. The first element of the message, bs, determines to which
base station the message is sent. If there are no messages in the msg buffer for
any particular base station then the local map of this base station is accurate,
i.e., it coincides with the global knowledge about the territory:
∀bs, z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ∧ bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ (bs 7→ (z 7→ s)) /∈ msg⇒
territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s),
∀bs·bs ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs /∈ dom(msg)⇒
(∀z, s·z ∈ 1 .. n ∧ s ∈ 1 .. k ⇒ territory(z)(s) = local map(bs)(z)(s)).
After receiving a notification about successful cleaning of a sector, a base
station marks this sector as cleaned in its local map and then broadcasts the
message about it to other base stations. To model this, we refine the abstract
events TaskSuccess and UpdateMap.
4.4 Introducing Robot and Base Station Failures
Fifth refinement. Now we aim at modelling possible robot failures. We elab-
orate on the abstract events concerning robot and zone reassigning. We start by
partitioning the robots into active and failed ones. The current set of all active
robots is defined by a new variable active. Initially all robots are active, i.e.,
active = RB. A new event RobotFailure models possible robot failures that can
happen at any time during system execution. We make an assumption that the
last active robot can not fail and add the corresponding guard card(active) > 1
to the event RobotFailure to restrict possible robot failures. In practice, the con-
straint to have at least one operational agent associated with our model can
be validated by probabilistic modelling of goal reachability, which is planned
as a future work. Let us also note that for multi-robotic systems with many
homogeneous agents this constraint is usually satisfied.
A base station monitors all its robots and detects the failed ones. The abstract
event TaskFailure abstractly models such robot detection.
To formalise the property (PR8), we should model a situation when some
base station does not have active robots anymore. In that case, some group
of active robots has to be sent to this base station from another base station.
This behaviour is modelled by the event ReassignNewBStoRBs that refines the
abstract event ReassignRB:
ReassignNewBStoRBs =̂ refines ReassignRB
any bs i, bs j, rbs
when bs i ∈ BS ∧ bs j ∈ BS ∧ rbs ⊂ active ∧ ran(rbs✁ attached) = {bs} ∧ rbs 6= ∅ ∧
ran(rbs✁ asgn s) = {0} ∧ bs i ∈ ran(responsible) ∧ bs j ∈ ran(responsible) ∧
bs i 6= bs j ∧ bs i ∈ ran(rbs✁− attached) ∧ dom(attached✄ {bs j}) * active
then attached := attached✁− (rbs× {bs j}) end
This event can be further refined by a concrete procedure to choose a particular
base station that will share its robots (e.g., based on load balancing).
Moreover, to ensure the property (PR9), we consider the situation when all
the sectors for which a base station is responsible are cleaned. In that case, all
the active robots of the base station may be sent to some other base station that
still has some unfinished cleaning to co-ordinate. This functionality is specified
by the event SendRobotsToBS (a refinement of the event ReassignRB).
Sixth refinement. In the final refinement step presented in the paper, we
aim at specifying the base station failures. Each base station might be either
operating or failed. We introduce a new variable operating ⊆ BS to define the set
of all operating base stations. We also introduce a new event BaseStationFailure
to model a possible base station failure. We again make an assumption that the
last active base station can not fail.
In the fourth refinement step we modelled by the event
GetAdditionalResponsibility that a base station can take over the responsibility
for the robots and zones of another base station. Now we can refine this event by
introducing an additional condition – only if a base station is detected as failed,
another base station can take over its responsibility for the respective zones and
robots:
GetAdditionalResponsibility =̂ refines GetAdditionalResponsibility
any bs i, bs j, za, rbs
when bs i ∈ BS∧bs j ∈ operating∧zs ⊂ 1..n ∧zs = dom(responsible✄{bs i}) ∧bs i 6= bs j ∧
rbs ⊂ active ∧ rbs = dom(attached✄ {bs i}) ∧ bs j /∈ dom(msg) ∧ bs i /∈ operating
then responsible := responsible ✁− (zs × {bs j}) ‖ attached := attached✁− (rbs× {bs j}) ‖
asgn s := asgn s✁− (rbs×{0}) ‖ asgn z := asgn z✁− (rbs×{0}) ‖ local map(bs i) := ∅
end
As a result of the presented refinement chain, we arrived at a centralised model
of the multi-robotic system. We can further refine the system to derive its dis-
tributed implementation, relying on the modularisation extension of Event-B to
achieve this.
To verify correctness of the models we discharged more than 230 proof obli-
gations. Around 80% of them have been proved automatically by the Rodin
platform and the rest have been proved manually in the Rodin interactive prov-
ing environment.
5 Conclusions and Related Work
Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken in [12,11]. The authors have
proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define such concepts
as mobility and context-awareness. Our modelling have pursued a different goal
– we have aimed at formally guaranteeing that the specified agent behaviour
achieves the pre-defined goals.
Formal modelling of fault tolerant MAS in Event-B has been also undertaken
by Ball and Butler [2]. They have proposed a number of informally described pat-
terns that allow the designers to incorporate well-known (static) fault tolerance
mechanisms into formal models. In our approach, we have implemented a more
advanced fault tolerance scheme that relies on goal reallocation and dynamic
reconfiguration to guarantee goal reachability.
The foundational work on goal-oriented development has been done by van
Lamsweerde [5]. The original motivation behind the goal-oriented development
was to structure the system requirements and derive properties in the form
of temporal logic formulas. Over the last decade, the goal-oriented approach
has received several extensions that allow the designers to link it with formal
modelling [6,7,9]. These works aimed at expressing temporal logic properties in
Event-B. In our work, we have relied on goals to facilitate structuring of the
system behaviour and derived a detailed system model that satisfies the desired
properties by refinement.
The theoretical aspects of modelling reachability has been studied in [3]. A
work similar to our but in the context of discovering a distributed topology is
presented in [4]. In our work, reasoning about liveness property has been put
in the context of goal-oriented development.
In this paper we have presented an approach to formal development of a
fault tolerant MAS with cooperative error recovery by refinement in Event-B.
The formal development has allowed us to uncover missing requirements and
rigorously define the relationships between agents. It has also facilitated a sys-
tematic derivation of a complex mechanism for cooperative error recovery.
Our approach has demonstrated a number of advantages comparing to vari-
ous process-algebraic approaches used for modelling MAS. We relied on a proof-
based verification that allowed us to derive a quite complex model of the be-
haviour of a multi-agent robotic system. We did not need to impose restrictions
on the size of the model, number of agents etc. We could comfortably express
intricate relationships between the system goals and the employed agents. There-
fore, we believe that Event-B and the associated tool set will provide a suitable
framework for formal modelling of complex MAS.
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